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 integration, transboundary pollution, trade, multilateral lending and invest
 ment, debt relief, governance of transnational corporations, labor and environ
 mental standards, gender equity, indigenous cultures, and poverty elimination.
 The presentation of Paths to a Green World is meticulously even-handed,
 an admirable trait for any scholarly survey, but especially so for one that
 covers a topic as heated and politicized as globalization and the environment.
 Still, instructors who utilize the text?and many should consider doing so?will
 want to also consider assigning materials that emanate more directly from
 within the four worldviews and that do not so studiously shy away from
 strongly asserting normative arguments or from drawing conclusions based
 on existing empirical evidence. Readers who follow Clapp and Dauvergne's
 discussion will come away with a nearly comprehensive map of the argument
 terrain in global environmental politics, but they may also come away some
 what numbed by the authors' assiduously descriptive, noncommittal approach,
 wondering in the end what the fuss is about, given that all of our evidence
 seems inconclusive and our argumentation perpetually rebuttable.
 Douglas A. Kysar
 Cornell Law School
 Understanding Institutional Diversity by Elinor Ostrom. Princeton, NJ,
 Princeton University Press, 2005. 376 pp. Cloth, $60.00; paper, $27.95.
 Is scientific discourse possible in the absence of shared language? Obviously
 not. In Understanding Institutional Diversity, Elinor Ostrom borrows a term to
 describe the state of discourse among those interested in the form and func
 tion of institutions: "babbling equilibrium." This occurs when people use com
 mon language to express divergent ideas.
 In this volume, which captures a great deal of Ostrom's well-known work,
 the author aims to establish a shared vocabulary and grammar for discus
 sions regarding institutions. It is a useful ambition. However, one wonders
 whether Ostrom's system demands too much from potential users. If there
 is one thing we know, the babbling equilibrium is a stable one. Adopting
 Ostrom's Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework requires
 mastery of jargon (e.g., "holons," "action arenas," "ADICO"), making its use
 costly. And here's the rub.
 Like the commons problems Ostrom is so well known for studying, the
 "babbling equilibrium" can only be overcome if a language is adopted uni
 versally (or nearly so). Therefore, inaccessibility of any proposed lingua franca
 is highly problematic. Sad though it may be, there is a shortage of incen
 tives for social scientists to worry about whether other scholars can synthe
 size their work with the existing body of knowledge. Combine the high costs
 of acquiring IAD fluency and the low rewards for doing so?especially in light
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 of the low likelihood that others will choose to follow such an irrational path?
 and you have a classic collective action problem.
 Ah, but is this a tragedy of the commons? That is, would we be better off
 if we were forced (perhaps fearing state sanction) to adopt Ostrom's frame
 work for discussions of institutions? The answer depends upon one's assess
 ment of the status quo and the IAD proposal. Ostrom's pessimistic view of the
 landscape is, in my view, accurate. Even across subfields of political sci
 ence, writers interested in institutions and organizations offer little recogni
 tion and utilization of work done by scholars in other subfields. With a
 background in the public administration literature, I am often shocked at
 the complete indifference to decades of work on the design, structure, and
 management of organizations when researchers in areas such as international
 relations confront the "black box" of organizations. And yet such oversight
 pales in comparison to the utter disregard of an entire discipline's work when
 scholars in one field move onto a "new" topic. Surely, the tower of institutional
 knowledge could reach greater heights if we all spoke the same language.
 The common tongue offered by Ostrom has a great deal to recommend it.
 She proposes to understand complex systems and the subsystems (dubbed
 "holons") of which they are comprised by looking at "action situations" (when
 actors are faced with decisions and must evaluate and choose among multi
 ple alternatives). With her framework, Ostrom proposes a list of elements
 making up the landscape with which we should be concerned. She is careful to
 distinguish this framework from a theory that would stipulate which parts
 matter when and a model that would posit assumptions and predictions
 about how and why the parts interact.
 The differentiation of frameworks, theories, and models is important
 because it means that Ostrom's IAD framework does not presuppose one
 set of assumptions or analytical tools. This may surprise some who asso
 ciate Ostrom with game theorists or like-minded scholars. Indeed, Ostrom
 illustrates many of the ideas in this book with simple games (for example, the
 "Snatch" game) and the layers of complexity that can be built upon them.
 Nevertheless, she is careful to point out that one can use her framework with
 multiple approaches or assumptions. A useful discussion, to illustrate this
 embracing of intellectual diversity, concerns the various ways in which a set
 of "rational actor" assumptions can be adapted. We might introduce the idea
 of bounded rationality to capture the incompleteness of information possessed
 by decision makers. We might alter the assumptions regarding individuals'
 valuation of outcomes (material benefits are not everything) to reflect the true
 variety of value systems. We might be more precise about the processes that
 individuals use to make decisions in different situations (under time pressure,
 say). While Ostrom acknowledges that some critics will see this as "messy,"
 she argues that it is a necessary sacrifice in order to get things right.
 In other respects, the IAD framework seems to be more rigid. Ostrom
 wants to differentiate among rules, norms, and strategies. Rules (she says) have
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 five elements: attributes, logical form (for example, may/must/must not),
 outcome, conditions, and consequences of "disobedience." Norms have no
 potential sanction. Strategies do not have conditional applicability. A nifty lit
 tle chart shows the humpty-dumpty nature of existing scholarship using
 these definitions; many people using the term "rules" don't meet Ostrom's
 definition, whereas some call her "rules" norms, and so on. The superiority
 of Ostrom's definition may not be clear, but it has the major advantage of
 being explicit.
 Common-pool governance systems have been the substantive focus of
 Ostrom's work on institutions, and the book concludes with an application
 of the IAD framework to this subject. In explaining what makes such a system
 effective, she notes eight variables common to all robust systems: defined
 boundaries, proportionality between costs and benefits, monitoring, conflict
 resolution mechanisms, graduated sanctions, recognized rights to organize
 governance mechanisms, participation, and subdivision of large systems.
 Although this is an interesting observation, it is not enough to conclude
 that these eight features ensure successful governance. Ostrom, in fact, con
 cedes that the eight characteristics are necessary but not sufficient to ensure
 success. She notes that rapidly changing environment, internal corruption,
 "blueprint thinking," and lack of infrastructure can doom governance arrange
 ments. But this begs the question. Why do some institutions avoid these pitfalls
 but others do not? How do we know that not all eight characteristics existed
 for many systems that have failed and disappeared? And if they did exist, and
 the systems still failed, can we really say with much confidence that these eight
 characteristics are vital? This problem of non-barking dogs may undermine
 the prescriptive advice drawn from Ostrom's conclusions.
 There is no doubt that we would be intellectually richer if all work on
 institutions were easily accessible. This is most likely to be accomplished if
 scholars try to stick with clear prose written in jargon-free common language.
 Still, Ostrom has created a vocabulary and grammar that accommodates
 multiple perspectives and arguments, even if it is partial to game theory.
 Indeed, the book's detours into more-formal analysis actually undermine
 this virtue by signaling that the IAD framework is for rat-choicers or game
 theorists only.
 Alas, the requirements for fluency seem a bit too high for widespread
 adoption of Ostrom-speak. Thus, we will likely continue babbling and hope for
 an improbable collective realization that if we all willingly accept individual
 costs (in full knowledge that it is irrational to so), we would benefit from the
 emergence of an institutional Esperanto.
 Jonathan Koppell
 Yale School of Management
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